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THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 33 FALL 1986 NUMBER 1 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF ENTRAPMENT LAW 
Paul Marcust 
INTRODUCTION 
The famous statement of a New York court characterizes nine-
teenth century attitudes towards the defense of entrapment: "We are 
asked to protect the defendant, not because he is innocent, but be-
cause a zealous public officer exceeded his powers and held out a 
bait. The courts do not look to see who held out the bait, but to see 
who took it."1 After all, once the crime is committed, why should it 
matter what particular incentives were involved and who offered 
them? The answer to this question encompasses a long history of 
evolving attitudes reflecting a growing, though limited, sympathy to-
ward the entrapped defendant. In addition, the public is increasingly 
intolerant of government activities that are likely to induce even a 
law abiding citizen to crime, or to state it more fashionably, one who 
was not "predisposed" to commit the crime. The history of the en-
trapment defense from nineteenth century indifference to the defense 
to modern intolerance for improper governmental conduct represents 
attempts to strike a balance between criminal predisposition on the 
one hand, and law enforcement practices on the other. Generally, the 
goal has been to catch the habitual criminal, but not at the expense 
of the innocent. A court's or jurisdiction's particular sympathies dic-
tate its judicial priorities. 
I. ENGLISH COMMON LAW 
Although the entrapment defense is generally accepted in the 
United States, the English courts generally still do not accept the 
t Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona. A.B. 1968; J.D. 1971, 
U.C.L.A. This Article is adapted from a forthcoming book entitled, THE ENTRAP-
MENT DEFENSE (Kluwer & Co., 1986) by Paul Marcus. 
1. People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274, 289, 70 N.E. 786, 791 (1904). 
5 
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doctrine. Thus, English precedent is understandably limited to a few 
cases in which the entrapment defense apparently was rejected. In 
1774, in perhaps the first case in which a court considered entrap-
ment as a defense to crime, the court held that highwaymen could 
not be excused for robbery on the ground that the victim flaunted his 
wares in hopes of being robbed.2 Later, in 1810, a court rejected 
entrapment when an agent of a bank purchased forged bank notes 
for the singular purpose of detection and prosecution.3 At trial the 
defendants maintained that "the disposition of the notes established 
by the evidence was insufficient, inasmuch as the prisoners were 
solicited to commit the act proved against them, by the bank them-
selves, by means of their agents."" Defense counsel attempted to dis-
tinguish previous cases on the ground that property could not be said 
to be taken "invito domino" when the offense "originates with the 
person supposed to be prejudiced by it."15 Moreover, "[i]f the treach-
ery of the servants of the bank would make the offense of the utter-
ers complete, it would be putting the lives of persons in the power of 
the bank and their agents."6 Although the judges did not pronounce 
an opinion regarding these arguments, they were unmoved. The pris-
oners were executed according to their sentence.7 
A later English case involved the classic "informer" that sug-
gests what has now become known as entrapment. In Regina v. Mul-
lins,8 a witness for the prosecution infiltrated certain meetings to ob-
tain information regarding a treasonable conspiracy. The witness' 
sole intent was to communicate this information to governmental au-
thorities. Though the issue before the court involved the applicability 
of an "accomplice testimony" rule to a governmental agent who only 
pretended to be an accomplice, the charge to the jury sustained the 
use of governmental "spies. " 9 
Although entrapment was not used as a defense in Mullins, the 
2. Norden's Case, Fost. Crim. Cas. 129 (1774). 
3. Regina v. Holden, 127 Eng. Rep. 1107 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1810). 
4. !d. at 1107. 
5. /d. at 1108. 
6. /d. at 1109. 
7. /d. 
8. 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 526 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1848). 
9. The court stated: 
A spy ... may be an honest man, he may think that the course he pur-
sues is absolutely essential for the protection of his own interests and those 
of society; and if he does so, if he believes that there is no other method of 
counteracting the dangerous designs of wicked men, I can see no impropri-
ety in his taking upon himself the character of an informer. The govern-
ment are, no doubt, justified in employing spies; and I do not see that a 
person so employed deserves to be blamed if he instigates offenses no fur-
ther than by pretending to concur with the perpetrators. 
/d. at 531. 
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government's inducement practices apparently were given approval. 
A stronger case of governmental inducement arose in 1880 in Re-
gina v. Titley. 10 In this case, the defendant chemist was indicted for 
unlawfully supplying materials designed to induce an abortion. A po-
lice officer went to the defendant's shop pretending to be the seducer 
of the pregnant woman. After initially insisting that the woman sub-
mit to an operation, the defendant agreed to provide an alternative 
chemical solution, which he sold to the officer. Although the govern-
mental officer's inducement activities were reasonably strong and in-
volved a fair degree of persistence, the defense did not contend that 
such practices were at all inappropriate. His sole argument was that 
the absence of the woman involved betrayed an insufficiency of evi-
dence to support the indictment. 
Until 1880, in no English case did a defendant appear to raise 
the issue of entrapment or inappropriate governmental inducement 
as a defense to a crime. This is arguably due not only to a general 
attitude against such defenses, but also to a lack of a case in which 
such governmental inducement clearly violated intuitive standards of 
fairness and justice. In current American terminology, no case ex-
isted in which the defendant was not otherwise "predisposed" to 
commit the criminal act. 
In 1881, a case arose in Scotland that seemed contrary to the 
English trend. In Blaikie v. Linton,11 the defendant was charged 
with selling whiskey without having a proper certificate pursuant to 
the Public-Houses Act of 1862.12 The defendant sold the whiskey to 
a governmental agent specifically employed to induce him to sell it. 
Though the judge convicted the defendant, he suspended his sen-
tence without opinion. When moving for the suspension, the defend-
ant pled that the conviction was improper because the police solic-
ited and entrapped him by saying that it would be a very great favor 
to the agent if he sold her the whiskey. Further, the defendant urged 
that the whole scheme was grossly unjust, oppressive and corrupt.13 
Despite the Blaike decision and some criticisms of police prac-
tices involving inducement that occasionally appeared in law journals 
of the day, H entrapment as a defense has not been sanctioned by the 
courts. The rejection of entrapment does not suggest necessarily that 
English courts were insensitive to the "innocent" victim of public 
10. 14 Cox Crim. Cas. 502 (Cent. Crim. Ct. 1880). 
II. 18 Scot. Law Rep. 583 (1881 ). 
12. !d. at 583. 
13. !d. 
14. See I CANADIAN L. TIMES 542 (1881) (discussed in DeFeo, Entrapment 
as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 
U.S.F.L. REV. 243, 246 (1967)); IRISH L. TIMES & Souc. J. 395, 410, 494, 583 
(1881); 71 LONDON L. TIMES 223 (1881). 
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inducement practices. Instead, it may reflect a policy decision that 
the victim of government inducement is usually "predisposed" to-
ward the criminal act that is induced, and thus not innocent. The 
English rejection of entrapment primarily seems to be a rejection of 
the idea that police activities can be inherently wrong irrespective of 
the defendant's mental state. Arguably, the English courts simply 
rely upon the strong, intuitively reasonable assumption that the en-
trapped defendant was predisposed. 
In Regina v. Bick/ey/15 a 1909 case, a governmental "spy" in-
duced the defendant to supply a drug to terminate pregnancy. En-
trapment was not raised as a defense and the defendant was con-
victed.16 After Bickley, the general question of governmental 
inducement did not arise again in a reported case until 1947 in Bran-
nan v. Peek.11 In that case, a plainclothed policeman induced a book-
maker to take a bet in a public house. Though entrapment was not 
an issue, Lord Goddard used the occasion to criticize the police con-
duct. He declared that permitting police officers to break the law to 
prove the offense of another is wrong, and he hoped that such prac-
tice would not become common in his country.18 
By American standards, the police conduct in Peek would not 
be extreme enough to constitute entrapment. In Browning v. J. W.H. 
Watson (Rochester), Ltd.,19 however, the actions of the licensing au-
thority clearly were unjust. In that case, the defendants were 
charged with "unlawfully permitting a motor coach to be used as an 
express carriage without a road service license."20 The carriage was 
used to transport members of a private club to football games, as 
such uses by "private parties" were permitted without a license. The 
legal infraction occurred when two nonmembers employed by the li-
censing authority secretly joined the party without the defendant's 
knowledge. The defendants were convicted solely because of the 
presence of the nonmembers. 
As mentioned, one need not, and perhaps should not, interpret 
the English rejection of entrapment as a betrayal of the notion of the 
"innocent" victim of governmental inducement. In fact, one com-
mentator has attributed the doctrine's rejection to its lack of a theo-
retical grounding.21 Thus, the contention is that entrapment as a de-
15. 2 Crim. App. 53 (1909). 
16. The court held that the evidence of a police spy requires no corroboration 
and that just because she was a spy does not invalidate her evidence. /d. at 54. The 
appellant argued that "here it is the police agent who herself suggested, instigated, 
and created the offense." /d. at 53. 
17. [1947] 2 All E.R. 572 (K.B.). 
18. /d. at 574. 
19. [1953] 2 All E.R. 775 (Q.B.). 
20. /d. at 775. 
21. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART§ 256, at 785 (2d ed. 
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fense is inappropriate because it cannot fit into established legal 
concepts. 22 
II. EARLY AMERICAN BEGINNINGS 
Entrapment as a defense in the United States gained acceptance 
slowly. As with the English, American courts initially adhered to the 
general attitude that a crime was a crime regardless of the circum-
stances surrounding its commission. Board of Commissioners v. 
Backus exemplified this view when the New York Supreme Court 
first stated the now famous Biblical analogy: 
Even if inducements to commit crime could be assumed to 
exist in this case, the allegation of the defendant would be 
but the repetition of the pleas as ancient as the world, and 
first interposed in Paradise: "The serpent beguiled me and I 
did eat." That defense was overruled by the great Lawgiver, 
and whatever estimate we may form, or whatever judgment 
pass upon the character or conduct of the tempter, this plea 
has never since availed to shield crime or give indemnity to 
the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code of civi-
lized, not to say christian ethics, it never will.23 
Though entrapment as a defense did not achieve general acceptance 
until well into the twentieth century, the defense was given early 
impetus in several influential pre-twentieth century state cases that 
attacked the propriety of governmental involvement in crime. 
In Saunders v. Michigan,24 a lawyer was accused of burglariz-. 
ing a police court room to secure certain contracts and other public 
records. Prior to the burglary, Saunders asked a policeman named 
Webb to assist him by leaving the door to the court unlocked. Before 
agreeing to this request, the policeman consulted with a superior who 
decided to use the occasion to lay a trap. At trial, the court refused 
to allow cross examination pertaining to Webb's illicit association 
1961 ). 
!d. 
22. Williams argues: 
Is there any technical means by which the courts could give effect to 
a defence of official instigation or procurement, if they were so minded? If 
one thinks merely in terms of established legal concepts, as the English 
courts have hitherto done, it may seem difficult to give an affirmative an-
swer. The police have no general power to consent to or authorize acts that 
would otherwise be breaches of the criminal law. The strict doctrine of 
estoppel has not been applied in criminal law, except in respect of estoppel 
by judgment . . . . There is no other ready-made doctrine to cover the 
situation. 
23. 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864). 
24. 38 Mich. 218 ( 1878). 
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with the defendant. In overruling the trial court on this refusal, Jus-
tice Cooley of the Michigan Supreme Court stated that the entrap-
ment context of the crime ought to be available to the jury as evi-
dence of the witness' credibility.211 A concurring opinion sharply and 
directly rebuked the police activity. 
I cannot . . . silently permit the extraordinary course 
adopted by the police officers in this case to pass unnoticed 
and uncondemned. 
The course pursued by the officers in this case was ut-
terly indefensible. Where a person contemplating the com-
mission of an offense approaches an officer of the law, and 
asks his assistance, it would seem to be the duty of the latter, 
according to the plainest principles of duty and justice, to 
decline to render such assistance, and to take such steps as 
would be likely to prevent the commission of the offense, and 
tend to the elevation and improvement of the would-be crimi-
nal, rather than to his farther debasement. Some courts have 
gone a great way in giving encouragement to detectives, in 
some very questionable methods adopted by them to discover 
the guilt of criminals; but they have not yet gone so far, and 
I trust never will, as to lend aid or encouragement to officers 
who may, under a mistaken sense of duty, encourage and as-
sist parties to commit crime, in order that they may arrest 
and have them punished for so doing. The mere fact that the 
person contemplating the commission of a crime is supposed 
to be an old offender can be no excuse, much less a justifica-
tion for the course adopted and pursued in this case. If such 
were the fact, then the greater reason would seem to exist 
why he should not be actively assisted and encouraged in the 
commission of a new offense which could in no way tend to 
throw light upon his past iniquities, or aid in punishing him 
therefor, as the law does not contemplate or allow the convic-
tion and punishment of parties on account of their general 
bad or criminal conduct, irrespective of their guilt or inno-
cence of the particular offense charged and for which they 
are being tried. Human nature is frail enough at best, and 
25. /d. at 220. The court emphasized that the witness did not entice the de-
fendant into crime but only allowed him the opportunity he already had sought. 
This reasoning suggests that even at this early date a distinction was already mani-
fest between providing an opportunity for an already predisposed defendant and ac-
tually instigating the criminal activity. Interestingly, though under modern stan-
dards "entrapment" probably did not occur here, the court still indicated 
disapproval of the witnesses' and government entrapping role. 
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requires no encouragement in wrong-doing.26 
The other leading case in the early development of entrapment 
in America is an 1879 case, O'Brien v. Texas.21 In O'Brien, the de-
fendant was convicted of attempting to bribe a jailer to procure the 
escape of an alleged murderer. The evidence is unclear whether the 
defendant or the jailer first suggested the possibility of a bribe; how-
ever, the jailer clearly went along with the plan in an effort to entrap 
the defendant. In its jury charge, the trial court stated that bribing 
an officer would be a violation of the law, regardless of who initially 
instigated the crime, and that an officer offering to be bribed would 
not be an accomplice under the existing statute. The court of appeals 
disagreed, holding that an officer who originates the criminal intent 
by first offering to accept a bribe and then joins in the criminal act 
to entrap the defendant does not violate the criminal code.28 Despite 
these two state cases, and perhaps others, courts failed to recognize 
entrapment as a defense. Other early state cases followed Saunders 
and O'Brien in condemning the entrapment practices of government, 
but few actually held that the entrapment entitled the defendant to 
an acquittal.29 
26. /d. at 221-22 (Marston, J., concurring). For its time this is a rather re-
markable quotation, particularly its sympathetic attitude toward an "entrapped" de-
fendant. As a moral indictment of police activities that encourage crime, it is time-
less, and represents a shifting of attitudes towards a future legitimation of 
entrapment defenses. The quotation is also informative. It confirms that "questiona-
ble methods" geared to the discovery of crime were already developing within en-
forcement agencies even though the agencies had not formally sanctioned encour-
agement of, or assistance in, crime to apprehend and punish criminals. 
Governmental practice eventually went this far, which is one reason that the entrap-
ment defense achieved a firm footing in American law. The modern entrapment 
defense, however, is much more limited than what is suggested as inappropriate in 
this opinion. Under the modern view, encouraging and assisting parties to commit 
crime when they are predisposed to do so is-at least by majority law-perfectly 
acceptable. 
27. 6 Tex. Crim. 665 (1879). 
28. !d. at 668. Interest in O'Brien extends beyond its early date. The sugges-
tion that "the case is not within the spirit" of the statute suggests the later doctrine 
of "legislative intent." Moreover, the appellate court seems to reject a somewhat 
literal statutory interpretation on the ground that no authority supports such a view, 
and accepts a rather nonliteral interpretation without citing authority. Thus, the 
court appears to say that entrapment is illegal because no authority says that it is 
legal. This is a rather handy-though unusual-way of introducing the entrapment 
defense into statutory law. Note the later version of this approach in Sorrells, in 
which the Supreme Court focused on the introduction of legislative intent as the 
foundation of the entrapment doctrine. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 
(1932). 
29. See Love v. People, I 16 III. 501, 43 N.E. 710 (1896) (burglary conviction 
reversed on ground that owner consented); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 42 Pa. Super. 
38 ( 19 I 0) (trial court did not err in refusing to order an acquittal on the ground of 
entrapment); Commonwealth v. Bickings, 12 Pa. D. 206 (1903) (entrapment by pri-
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Early federal cases also followed the sympathetic view of en-
trapment as a defense. The earliest case is United States v. Whit-
tier.30 The defendant in Whittier offered the defense of entrapment 
in a nonmailable matter case, claiming inducement by an agent of 
the Society for the Suppression of Vice.31 Though the defendant was 
acquitted on other grounds, a concurring opinion condemned entrap-
ment practices. Citing the lack of dispositive case law, the concur-
rence stated that a court should not "lend its countenance to a viola-
tion of positive law, or to contrivances for inducing a person to 
commit a crime."32 The concurrence stressed that "resort to unlaw-
ful means is not to be encouraged," even though such means will be 
unavailable as a defense to the offender.33 
In a later federal case, United States v. Adams,34 the defendant 
had been charged with illegally mailing contraceptive information, a 
crime based upon a nonmailable matter statute. The defendant's 
mailing had been in response to a decoy letter of inquiry written by a 
governmental inspector. Citing Whittier and Saunders, the Court 
held that no crime had been committed under the particular facts of 
the case.35 
As with the state courts, entrapment generally remained a mere 
subject of displeasure in the federal courts until 1915 when a case 
finally appeared before a circuit court and launched entrapment as a 
criminal defense. In Woo Wai v. United States,36 the defendants had 
been convicted of conspiring to illegally bring certain Chinese per-
sons into the United States from Mexico. At trial the defendant as-
serted that no law had been broken since government officers had 
induced the defendants into committing the alleged acts. N everthe-
less, the trial court instructed the jury that, even if the facts were as 
the defendants stated, they would not constitute a legal defense to 
the charge.37 Notably, the defendant Woo Wai was approached and 
induced into committing the crime not because he previously had 
been suspected of being involved in any illegality, but because the 
authorities suspected that he had information about the illegal activ-
ities of others. The intent of the officers was to induce Woo Wai into 
the commission of a crime to make him reveal what he knew. Woo 
Wai at first expressed reluctance to participate in the scheme, say-
vate person). 
30. 28 F. Cas. 591 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878) (No. 16,688). 
31. Since this was a private society, not involving government, the entrapment 
defense did not strictly apply. 
32. 28 F. Cas. at 594 (Treat, J., concurring). 
33. /d. 
34. 59 F. 674 (D. Or. 1894). 
35. /d. at 676-77. 
36. 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915). 
37. /d. at 413. 
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ing, "This is in violation of the law. It could not be done."38 He 
eventually was persuaded after repeated solicitations spanning sev-
eral months. In reversing Woo Wai's conviction, the circuit court of 
appeals noted: 
We are of the opinion that it is against public policy to sus-
tain a conviction obtained in the manner which is disclosed 
by the evidence in this case . . . and that a sound public 
policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality of those 
who are thus induced to commit acts which infringe the let-
ter of the criminal statutes. 39 
The court distinguished the cases that had not recognized entrap-
ment as a defense to crime. In those cases, the defendants originated 
the criminal intent to commit the crime, while in Woo Wai the gov-
ernmental officers suggested the criminal act.40 
Woo Wai clearly marked the beginning of the modern doctrine 
of entrapment with its emphasis on-and limitation of-the notion 
of "origin of intent." The entrapment defense was applicable only to 
cases in which the intent to commit the crime originated in the 
minds of the governmental agents rather than the accused. Govern-
mental conduct encouraging and even participating in crime was 
permissible;n After the Woo Wai decision, the entrapment defense 
became prevalent in the lower federal courts concomitantly with con- ,,_ 
fusion as to its proper application and scope.42 
In retrospect, it is somewhat remarkable that the entrapment 
defense won judicial credibility in America in such a short time, par-
ticularly when English law has yet to embrace the controversial doc-
trine. Identifying a single cause for the acceptance would be too sim-
plistic; a number of circumstances undoubtedly contributed. At least 
one commentator has emphasized the nature and role of the crimes 
that developed during the period in question.43 
38. !d. 
39. !d. at 415. 
40. !d. 
41. The holding in Woo Wai was based on "public policy," an approach seem-
ingly best suited to the minority, objective approach to entrapment. See infra text 
accompanying notes 58-62. 
42. See generally Annat., 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933); Annat., 66 A.L.R. 478 
( 1930); Annat., 18 A.L.R. 146 ( 1922). For early discussions of the entrapment de-
fense, see Note, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1067 (1928); Comment, 2 S. CAL. L. REV. 283 
(1929); Note, 41 YALE LJ. 1249 (1931). 
Most of the early confusion surrounding the entrapment defense after Woo Wai 
centered on the proper theoretical grounding of the defense and the appropriateness 
of the defense under particular circumstances. Some courts continued to reject the 
defense altogether, and the defense received occasional judicial criticism. See, e.g., 
United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927). 
43. DeFeo, supra note 14, at 250-51, states: 
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Ill. ENTRAPMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT 
A. The Beginnings 
By the time the United States Supreme Court addressed the 
entrapment defense in 1928, the acceptance of the defense in Ameri-
can courts was well on its way. In Casey v. United States,44 the de-
fendant was accused of supplying morphine to prison inmates ad-
dicted to narcotics. The defendant was a lawyer who frequently 
visited inmates to provide legal consultation. The jailer observed, 
however, that, after the defendant's visits, inmates whom he had vis-
ited frequently were under the influence of narcotics. At the jailer's 
instigation, an elaborate scheme was concocted to trap the defend-
ant. The narrow issue in Casey was whether possession of morphine 
not in the original stamped package was sufficient evidence to sus-
tain the charge that it was illegally purchased. The majority dis-
missed the entrapment issue by offhandedly stating, "Furthermore 
Casey according to the story was in no way induced to commit the 
crime beyond the simple request of Cicero to which he seems to have 
acceded without hesitation and as a matter of course."45 
The majority's rather curt dismissal in Casey of the entrapment 
claim might well have gone unnoticed but for Justice Brandeis' 
strong dissent focusing on the government's conduct. Brandeis' com-
ments brought attention to the entrapment issue, paving the way for 
the Sorrells decision and its progeny. 
I am aware that courts-mistaking relative social values and 
forgetting that a desirable end cannot justify foul 
means-have, in their zeal to punish, sanctioned the use of 
evidence obtained through criminal violation of property and 
personal rights or by other practices of detectives even more 
The cause of this phenomenon was basically the nature of the crimes in 
which entrapment practices are used .by the police. America in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed the coming of Com-
stockery, the Mann Act, the Harrison Drug Act, Prohibition and sumptu-
ary legislation generally to a degree unheard of at common law .... 
The significance of all these new crimes is their inadaptability to a 
prosecutor scheme based on private complaint .... Consequently the cre-
ation of these new offenses brought unaccustomed difficulties of enforce-
ment in the attempt to discover the existence of criminal activity and to 
gather evidence of same. Viewed in historical perspective, the whole prob-
lem of entrapment has stemmed from a judicial reaction to the means used 
by police to achieve presence of such illegal transactions, either in person 
or through the agency of informers. 
In considering the entrapment cases of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, DeFeo's comment may be an overstatement. A significant number of cases 
did not directly involve "vice" crimes. 
44. 276 u.s. 413 (1928). 
45. /d.at419. 
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revolting. But the objection here is of a different nature .. 
The obstacle to the prosecution lies in the fact that the al-
leged crime was instigated by officers of the Government; 
that the act for which the Government seeks to punish the 
defendant is the fruit of their criminal conspiracy to induce 
its commission. The Government may set decoys to entrap 
criminals. But it may not provoke or create a crime and then 
punish the criminal, its creature. . . . Their conduct is not a 
defense to [the defendant]. For no officer of the Government 
has power to authorize the violation of an Act of Congress 
and no conduct of an officer can excuse the violation. But it 
does not follow that the court must suffer a detective-made 
criminal to be punished. To permit that would be tantamount 
to a ratification by the Government of the officers' unautho-
. rized and unjustifiable conduct. 
. . . This prosecution should be stopped, not because 
some right of [the defendant's] has been denied, but in order 
to protect the Government. To protect it from illegal conduct 
of its officers. To preserve the purity of its courts."6 
B. Sorrells v. United States"7 
15 
The significance of the Supreme Court's treatment of the en-
trapment defense in Sorrells can not be overstated. It is not that 
Sorrells established entrapment as a defense, nor even that it pro-
vided legitimacy or credibility. Though the opinion significantly fur-
thered these ends, the primary and pervasive impact of Sorrells was 
its establishment of the theoretical underpinning of entrapment doc-
trine. In many circumstances, such a contribution may be merely of 
academic importance. But with the entrapment doctrine, it had far-
reaching influence over the scope of the doctrine and the nature of 
its development and application in both federal and state courts. 
The influence of the Sorrells case is not limited to the majority 
opinion. The minority view of Justice Roberts also was to have a 
tremendous impact on the nature of the acceptance and application 
of the doctrine. Its alternative theoretical view was sufficiently com-
pelling to divide both the Court and the judicial and academic com-
munities for decades. The entrapment doctrine as applied today re-
flects the tensions that were first apparent there. Sorrells was a 
prohibition case in which a governmental agent visited the home of 
the defendant and repeatedly coaxed him to secure a quantity of li-
46. /d. at 423-25. 
47. 287 u.s. 435 (1932). 
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quor. After three attempts in which the agent played upon the com-
radery of war experiences, the defendant finally provided a half gal-
lon of liquor for which he was paid. Though the government called 
witnesses who testified that the defendant had a general reputation 
as a "rum runner," the Court found that "the act for which defend-
ant was prosecuted was instigated by the prohibition agent, . . . 
[and] that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it.""8 
After acknowledging that merely affording opportunities or facilities 
to commit a crime does not of itself defeat the prosecution, the ma-
jority identified the limits of governmental conduct: "A different 
question is presented when the criminal design originates with the 
officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an in-
nocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and in-
duce its commission in order that they may prosecute.""9 
The Sorrells Court cited numerous cases for the proposition 
that the truly entrapped defendant should not be punished. Butts v. 
United States50 typified this proposition and the Court quoted the 
opinion at length. 51 The substance of the Court's initial remarks was 
relatively uncontroversial and merely reflected the rhetoric of the en-
trapment doctrine that numerous lower court cases offered. Signifi-
cantly, however, the Court then eased its way into the now famous 
theoretical justification involving "legislative intent." Noting that lit-
eral statutory interpretation can produce absurd results or flagrant 
injustice,52 the Court concluded that Congress did not intend "that 
its processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by the 
instigation by government officials of an act on the part of persons 
otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to 
punish them. " 53 The Court further added that in such a case the 
48. Id. at 441. 
49. Id. at 442. 
50. 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921 ). 
5 I. The Butts court stated: 
[l]t is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the established Jaw 
of the land to punish a man for the commission of an offense of the like of 
which he had never been guilty, either in thought or in deed, and evidently 
never would have been guilty of if the officers of the Jaw had not inspired, 
incited, persuaded, and lured him to an attempt to commit it. 
/d. at 38, quoted in 287 U.S. at 444-45. In a similar vein, the Court cited and 
quoted from Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 419, 423 (1928); Ellis v. United 
States, 206 U.S. 246, 257 (I 907); Newman v. United States, 299 F. 128, 131 (4th 
Cir. 1924). 
52. 287 U.S. at 446. The Court cited or quoted United States v. Katz, 271 
U.S. 354 (1926); Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U.S. 47 (1892); United States 
v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 278 (1869); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 
Wheat.) 471, 477 (1818). 
53. 287 U.S. at 448. 
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government is estopped from prosecuting.114 The majority in Sorrells 
explicitly rejected the view that the Court had authority to grant 
immunity to an entrapped defendant if the statute in question ap-
plied to him.1111 Thus, the majority viewed the adoption of "legislative 
intent" as a necessity of accommodating the entrapment defense. 
The doctrine of legislative intent-the idea that the legislature 
did not intend that a criminal statute extend to entrapped defend-
ants-suggests two further doctrines that have been the focus of con-
troversy with regard to entrapment. First, since the statute does not 
extend to the entrapped defendant, the entrapped defendant must be 
innocent of the crime. Therefore, under this view, entrapment would 
not be a matter of confession and avoidance, but would go directly to 
a challenge of the defendant's guilt: the government is "estopped to 
prosecute" because the defendant is not guilty.118 Generally, the guilt 
or innocence of a defendant is a jury question.117 Nevertheless, the 
Court in Sorrells explicitly acknowledged that the entrapped defend-
ant was not guilty of the crime.118 
The second doctrine emerging from the notion of "legislative in-
tent" is that of "predisposition." This single word has generated the 
bulk of controversy concerning the entrapment defense. As indicated 
above, the "legislative intent" view claims that the criminal statute 
does not extend to persons who are "otherwise innocent." This char-
acterization indicates that the entrapped defendant will be in a cer-
tain mental state of innocence before governmental inducement in-
vades this disposition. Entrapment, by definition, encompasses the 
54. !d. 
55. The majority stated that "[w]here defendant has been duly indicted for 
an offense found to be within the statute, and the proper authorities seek to proceed 
with the prosecution, the court cannot refuse to try the case in the constitutional 
method because it desires to let the defendant go free." /d. at 449-50. 
56. The use of estoppel in Sorrells seems misplaced. Under the view of legis-
lative intent, there is no estoppel effect since the entrapment question becomes part 
of the guilt-innocence determination of the trier of fact. "Estoppel" would seem to 
be applicable if entrapment involved criteria independent of the defendant's guilt or 
innocence, as in the minority Sorrells view. 
57. One source of confusion regarding the entrapment doctrine is whether the 
judge or jury should decide entrapment. Under the legislative intent doctrine, en-
trapment is apparently a jury question. See Marcus, The Entrapment Defense and 
the Procedural Issues: Burden of Proof. Questions of Law and Fact, Inconsistent 
Defenses, 22 CRJM. L. BULL. 197 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Entrapment 
Procedures]. 
58. The Sorrells Court reasoned: 
The defense is available, not in the view that the accused though guilty 
may go free, but that the Government cannot be permitted to contend that 
he is guilty of a crime where the government officials are the instiga!ors of 
his conduct. The federal courts in sustaining the defense in such circum-
stances have proceeded in the view that the defendant is not guilty. 
287 U.S. at 452. 
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idea that the entrapped defendant is not predisposed to commit the 
crime. Predisposition of the accused becomes all important, for "the 
issues raised and the evidence adduced must be pertinent to the con-
trolling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise inno-
cent whom the Government is seeking to punish for an alleged of-
fense which is the product of the creative activity of its own 
officials."59 Because of the "controlling" nature of the predisposition 
question, the Sorrells majority acknowledged the need to allow evi-
dence that would, under normal circumstances, be inadmissible as 
prejudicial.60 The majority's adoption of legislative intent, along with 
its related doctrines of the entrapped defendant's innocence and pre-
disposition, generated difficult questions extending beyond the mere 
definition of entrapment. These include judge versus jury61 and bur-
den of proof62 questions, along with the issue of the propriety of in-
consistent defenses.63 
The minority opinion in Sorrells remains quite important be-
cause it represents the modern trend in the entrapment defense. The 
main focus of the opinion-an alternative conception of entrap-
ment-suggests different attitudes towards both the defendant's 
mental state and the procedural questions surrounding the defense. 
Speaking for the minority (Justices Brandeis and Stone), Justice 
Roberts emphasized the public policy justification for the entrap-
ment defense that numerous cases had stated and that the majority 
had acknowledged. He claimed, however, that such an underpinning 
requires neither fiction of legislative intent nor the excusing of a 
guilty defendant.64 After criticizing the majority's doctrine of legisla-
tive intent as "unwarranted judicial construction,"65 Justice Roberts 
added that entrapment rests on public policy and that it is the 
Court's province "to protect itself and the government from such 
prostitution of the criminal law."66 Roberts followed the natural 
course of his justification of entrapment by suggesting that generally 
the question of entrapment would be one for the judge rather than 
59. /d. at 451 (emphasis added). 
60. /d. at 451-52. 
61. See Entrapment Procedures, supra note 57, at 211-42. 
62. /d. 
63. /d. 
64. Justice Roberts explained: 
This view calls for no distinction between crimes mala in se and statu-
tory offenses of lesser gravity; requires no statutory construction, and at-
tributes no merit to a guilty defendant; but frankly recognizes the true 
foundation of the doctrine in the public policy which protects the purity of 
government and its processes. 
287 U.S. at 455. 
65. Id. at 456. 
66. /d. at 457. 
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the jury.67 He closed his opinion with a biting criticism of the major-
ity's acceptance of an investigation into a defendant's past.68 
Roberts' opinion was effective more as a criticism of the major-
ity view and "legislative intent" ground than it was at articulating a 
plausible alternative. Though it suggests a focal point away from the 
accused toward governmental conduct, the opinion offered little ex-
planation of what governmental conduct would constitute entrap-
ment. More particularly, the question arises as to how such conduct 
can be measured as appropriate or inappropriate without reference 
to the predisposition of the accused. If appropriate governmental 
conduct is a function of the accused's predisposition, then the inquiry 
returns to an examination of the accused's predisposition to deter-
mine entrapment. Justice Frankfurter was left the task of formulat-
ing this approach more fully in the next major Supreme Court 
decision. 
C. Sherman v. United States69 
The facts in Sherman created an interesting case in which to 
assess the merits and difficulties of the two opposing approaches to 
entrapment. The defendant was convicted of selling narcotics. A gov-
ernmental informer had first met the defendant in a doctor's office 
where both were apparently being treated for narcotics addiction. 
After several meetings under similar circumstances, they developed a 
friendship. Soon after, the governmental informer began to ask the 
defendant for the name of a source for narcotics. After repeated re-
quests predicated on the informant's presumed "suffering," the de-
fendant supplied the drugs. The evidence indicated that the informer 
not only induced the defendant to commit the crime, but to return to 
his drug habit as well. 
After reviewing the Court's decision in Sorrells, the majority in 
67. Roberts seemed rather noncommittal on this point. He merely noted: "If 
in doubt as to the facts it may submit the issue of entrapment to a jury for advice. 
But whatever may be the finding upon such submission the power and the duty to 
act remain with the court and not with the jury." /d. For a discussion of the judge-
jury question, see Entrapment Procedures, supra note 57, at 211. 
68. Justice Roberts concluded: 
To say that such conduct by an official of government is condoned and 
rendered innocuous by the fact that the defendant had a bad reputation or 
had previously transgressed is wholly to disregard the reason for refusing 
the processes of the court to consummate an abhorrent transaction. . . . 
The accepted procedure, in effect, pivots conviction in such cases, not on 
the commission of the crime charged, but on the prior reputation or some 
former act or acts of the defendant not mentioned in the indictment. 
287 U.S. at 459. 
69. 356 u.s. 369 (1958). 
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Sherman held that entrapment was established as a matter of law.70 
The precise basis for this holding is unclear. The Court carefully 
reaffirmed the Sorrells decision, focusing its opinion upon the de-
fendant's lack of predisposition. The defendant was previously con-
victed of illegally selling and possessing narcotics. The Court rea-
soned, however, that "a nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-
year-old possession conviction are insufficient to prove petitioner had 
a readiness to sell narcotics ... particularly when we must assume 
from the record he was trying to overcome the narcotics habit at the 
time."71 The difficulty with this conclusion is in determining how a 
man, previously convicted of both the sale and possession of narcot-
ics, and who evidently was still an addict, could be entrapped as a 
matter of law. 
Alternatively, the Court may have based its conclusion on the 
distasteful practices of the governmental informer rather than on the 
defendant's predisposition.72 The strong language of the Court has 
led some to suggest that the agent exhibited conduct tantamount to 
a constitutional violation of due process.73 
The facts in Sherman dramatically illustrate the danger of as-
sessing a defendant's predisposition through past conduct and repu-
tation. Relying on Sorrells, the trial court rejected the defendant's 
entrapment defense and convicted him. A unanimous court of ap-
peals affirmed the conviction. 74 
70. /d. at 373. 
71. /d. at 375-76. 
72. The Court stated: 
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of entrapment is 
designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone attempt-
ing to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into 
returning to the habit of use. Selecting the proper time, the informer then 
tells the government agent. The setup is accepted by the agent without 
even a question as to the manner in which the informer encountered the 
seller. Thus the government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party 
and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not 
have attempted. Law enforcement does not require methods such as this. 
/d. at 376. 
73. See generally Entrapment Procedures, supra note 57. 
74. 356 U.S. at 372. The Second Circuit heard the case twice. In the second 
opinion, with the court affirming, the opinion principally discussed the proper use of 
prior convictions as evidence of predisposition. 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1957). In the 
first opinion, however, Judge Hand dealt broadly with the basic defense contention: 
As we understand the doctrine it comes to this: that it is a valid reply to 
the defence, if the prosecution can satisfy the jury that the accused was 
ready and willing to commit the offense charged, whenever the opportunity 
offered. In that event the inducement which brought about the actual of-
fense was no more than one instance of the kind of conduct in which the 
accused was prepared to engage; and the prosecution has not seduced an 
innocent person, but has only provided the means for the accused to realize 
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Sherman provided an excellent opportunity to develop the mi-
nority view of entrapment. Justice Frankfurter launched an attack 
on the majority view, echoing much that Justice Roberts had stated 
twenty-five years previously. The concurrence voiced two sharp criti-
cisms of the majority's subjective predisposition test. First, such a 
test relying on jury determinations, would not develop standards of 
proper police conduct in these difficult situations.n; Second, the 
Court's test was based on an odd and dangerous concept-legislative 
intent. According to Justice Frankfurter, the notion that convictions 
must be overturned because Congress did not intend its statutes to 
be enforced by temptation is sheer fiction. He reasoned that in en-
trapment cases the only legislative intent inherent in the statute is 
"to make criminal precisely the conduct in which the defendant has 
engaged."76 Furthermore, he argued that "conduct is not less crimi-
nal because the result of temptation, whether the tempter is a pri-
vate person or a government agent or informer."77 Unfortunately, 
Justice Frankfurter's opinion is more of a critique than a set of di-
his preexisting purpose. The proof of this may be by evidence of his past 
offenses, of his preparation, even of his "ready complaisance." Obviously, 
it is not necessary that the past offenses proved shall be precisely the same 
as that charged, provided they are near enough in kind to support an infer-
ence that his purpose included offenses of the sort charged. 
200 F.2d 880, 882 (2d Cir. 1952). 
75. In his conclusion, Justice Frankfurter made the point forcefully: 
[A] jury verdict, although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the 
particular case, cannot give significant guidance for official conduct for 
the future. Only the court, through the gradual evolution of explicit stan-
dards in accumulated precedents, can do this with the degree of certainty 
that the wise administration of criminal justice demands. 
356 U.S. at 385. 
76. /d. at 379. His argument continued: 
It might be thought that it is largely an academic question whether 
the court's finding a bar to conviction derives from the statute or from a 
supervisory jurisdiction over the administration of criminal justice; under 
either theory substantially the same considerations will determine whether 
the defense of entrapment is sustained. But to look to a statute for guid-
ance in the application of a policy not remotely within the contemplation 
of Congress at the time of its enactment is to distort analysis. It is to run 
the risk, furthermore, that the court will shirk the responsibility that is 
necessarily in its keeping, if Congress is truly silent, to accommodate the 
dangers of overzealous law enforcement and civilized methods adequate to 
counter the ingenuity of modern criminals. The reasons that actually un-
derlie the defense of entrapment can too easily be lost sight of in the pur-
suit of a wholly fictitious congressional intent. 
/d. at 381. 
77. /d. at 380. Justice Frankfurter stated that the reason courts refuse to con-
vict an entrapped defendant is because "the methods employed on behalf of the 
Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced." /d. 
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rections on the application of objective standards.78 
D. United States v. Russe/f79 
In Russell, governmental agents were heavily involved in the 
commission of the crime by supplying the defendants with a scarce 
but necessary ingredient with which to manufacture 
methamphetamine ("speed"). After the drug was manufactured, the 
agents arrested the defendants.80 The court of appeals had reversed 
the conviction, relying on the argument that the government's con-
duct was overreaching. The court found entrapment had occurred as 
a matter of law.81 
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, viewed the case differently. 
He traced the entrapment doctrine from Sorrells to Sherman, reaf-
firmed it,82 and concluded that the key inquiry is properly focused on 
the individual's state of mind, not the government's involvement. The 
Court noted that entrapment is a limited defense rooted in the pre-
mise that a defendant should not be punished for committing a 
crime when the government induces its commission.83 The Court fur-
78. See generally id. at 382. Justice Frankfurter did comment on the objec-
tive test: 
This test shifts attention from the record and predisposition of the particu-
lar defendant to the conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectively 
considered, that it would entrap only those ready and willing to commit 
crime. It is as objective a test as the subject matter permits, and will give 
guidance in regulating police conduct that 'is lacking when the reasonable-
ness of police suspicions must be judged or the criminal disposition of the 
defendant retrospectively appraised. It draws directly on the fundamental 
intuition that led in the first instance to the outlawing of "entrapment" as 
a prosecutorial instrument. The power of government is abused and di-
rected to an end for which it was not constituted when employed to pro-
mote rather than detect crime and to bring about the downfall of those 
who, left to themselves, might well have obeyed the law. Human nature is 
weak enough and sufficiently beset by temptations without government ad-
ding to them and generating crime. 
What police conduct is to be condemned, because likely to induce 
those not otherwise ready and willing to commit crime, must be picked out 
from case to case as new situations arise involving different crimes and 
new methods of detection. 
/d. at 384. 
79. 411 u.s. 423 (1973). 
80. The agent's scheme was straightforward and well orchestrated. The de-
fendants seemed amazingly trusting. /d. at 425-26. 
81. The court had concluded that "a defense to a criminal charge may be 
founded upon an intolerable degree of governmental participation in the criminal 
enterprise." /d. at 424 (quoting 459 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1972)). The appellate 
court's position rested on both entrapment and due process grounds. /d. at 427-28. 
82. He acknowledged, however, that criticism of the rule was "not devoid of 
appeal." /d. at 433-34. 
83. Id. at 435. 
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ther noted that the purpose of the entrapment defense is not to pro-
tect against overzealous law enforcement.84 
The majority rejected the defense argument that the conviction 
should be reversed on a ground analogous to the fourth and fifth 
amendments' exclusionary rules, noting that the exclusionary rule 
was adopted because the government failed to follow its own laws. 
Unlike the exclusionary rule cases, "the Government's conduct here 
violated no independent constitutional right of the respondent."811 
Further, the police agent did not violate any federal law in infiltrat-
ing the criminal enterprise. 88 
The Court also rejected the defendant's due process argument. 
In essence, the defendant argued that the government's overinvolve-
ment was so outrageous and so contrary to public policy that the 
conviction could not stand. Although the majority did not deny the 
legitimacy of such a ground,87 it found that the facts in the instant 
case did not justify the application of the principle.88 
84. /d. 
85. Id. at 430. The Court continued: 
Respondent would overcome this basic weakness in his analogy to the 
exclusionary rule cases by having the Court adopt a rigid constitutional 
rule that would preclude any prosecution when it is shown that the crimi-
nal conduct would not have been possible had not an undercover agent 
"supplied an indispensable means to the commission of the crime that 
could not have been obtained otherwise, through legal or illegal channels." 
Even if we were to surmount the difficulties attending the notion that due 
process of law can be embodied in fixed rules, and those attending respon-
dent's particular formulation, the rule he proposes would not appear to be 
of significant benefit to him. For, on the record presented, it appears that 
he cannot fit within the terms of the very rule he proposes. 
The record discloses that although the propanone was difficult to ob-
tain, it was by no means impossible. The defendants admitted making the 
drug both before and after those batches made with the propanone sup-
plied by Shapiro. 
/d. at 431. 
86. /d. at 430. 
87. The Court acknowledged that some day police conduct may be "so outra-
geous that due process principles would absolutely bar the government from invok-
ing judicial processes to obtain a conviction," but found that the instant case fell 
outside of that category. /d. at 431-32. 
88. The Court stated: 
[The agent's] contribution of propanone to the criminal enterprise already 
in process was scarcely objectionable. The chemical is by itself a harmless 
substance and its possession is legal. While the Government may have 
been seeking to make it more difficult for drug rings, such as that of which 
respondent was a member, to obtain the chemical, the evidence described 
above shows that it nonetheless was obtainable. The Jaw enforcement con-
duct here stops far short of violating that "fundamental fairness, shocking 
to the universal sense of justice," mandated by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. 
/d. at 432 (citations omitted). 
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Justice Rehnquist elaborated on the need for undercover gov-
ernmental involvement to detect crime, particularly crimes such as 
drug manufacturing. He noted that illegal drug manufacturing is an 
ongoing business enterprise for which detection and conviction re-
quires infiltration of, and limited participation in, the enterprise's il-
legal practices.89 Because infiltration is deemed an appropriate 
means of investigation, supplying a valuable item to the crime ring 
must, generally, also be acceptable.90 An agent may fail to infiltrate 
the crime ring without a proffer of something of value to the 
criminals.91 These types of practices do not violate "fundamental 
fairness" or "shock the universal sense of justice."92 Finding such 
involvement a necessity, the majority deemed the objective test of 
the dissent unworkable and contrary to public policy.93 
Justice Stewart's dissent94 indicated that the position of Justices 
Roberts and Frankfurter was consistent with the supporting ration-
ale for the entrapment defense. He reiterated that the entrapment 
defense could not be grounded in legislative intent, for "to say that 
such a defendant is 'otherwise innocent' or not 'predisposed' to com-
mit the crime is misleading, at best. The very fact that he has com-
mitted [the crime] ... demonstrates conclusively that he is not in-
nocent of the offense."95 
Once again, it was asserted that the true basis for the entrap-
ment defense is to monitor governmental overinvolvement in crime. 
Therefore, the inquiry is not the defendant's predisposition to crime, 
but whether "the government agents have acted in such a way as is 
likely to instigate or create a criminal offense."96 The appropriate-
89. /d. 
90. /d. 
91. /d. 
92. /d. 
93. The Court stated that complete immunity for a crime is not desirable 
"simply because government undercover agents subjected [the criminal] to induce-
ments which might have seduced a hypothetical individual who was not so predis-
posed." !d. at 434. 
/d. 
94. /d. at 439. Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall also dissented. 
95. /d. at 442. He explained his point more fully: 
He may not have originated the precise plan or the precise details, but he 
was "predisposed" in the sense that he has proved to be quite capable of 
committing the crime. That he was induced, provoked, or tempted to do so 
by government agents does not make him any more innocent or any less 
predisposed than he would be if he had been induced, provoked or tempted 
by a private person-which, of course, would not entitle him to cry "en-
trapment." Since the only difference between these situations is the iden-
tity of the tempter, it follows that the significant focus must be on the 
conduct of the government agents, and not on the predisposition of the 
defendant. 
96. /d. at 441. 
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ness of the agents' methods must be determined by the trial judge, 
not the jury.97 The dissent, applying these principles to this case, 
concluded that the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law 
and that the case should never have gone to the jury.98 The Court 
had considered the dissent's view on several prior occasions and was 
not about to change its position. 
E. Hampton v. United States99 
The most recent Supreme Court decision on entrapment in-
volved a defendant's claim that the heroin he allegedly sold was sup-
plied by a governmental informer who entrapped him into selling it 
to other governmental officers. Although testimony of the informer 
was not consistent with that of the defendant Hampton, the defense 
requested that the court instruct the jury to acquit the defendant if 
the jury found that an informer supplied the narcotics.100 Relying on 
97. /d. 
98. Justice Stewart emphasized his view of the facts: 
But assuming in this case that the phenyl-2-propanone was obtainable 
through independent sources, the fact remains that that used for the par-
ticular batch of methamphetamine involved in all three counts of the in-
dictment with which the respondent was charged-i.e., that produced on 
December I 0, 1969-was supplied by the government. This essential in-
gredient was indisputably difficult to obtain, and yet what was used in 
committing the offenses of which the respondent was convicted was offered 
to the respondent by the Government agent, on the agent's own initiative, 
and was readily supplied to the respondent in needed amounts. If the 
chemical was so easily available elsewhere, then why did not the agent 
simply wait until the respondent had himself obtained the ingredients and 
produced the drug, and then buy it from him? The very fact that the agent 
felt it incumbent upon him to offer to supply phenyl-2-propanone in return 
for the drug casts considerable doubt on the theory that the chemical could 
easily have been procured without the agent's intervention, and that there-
fore the agent merely afforded an opportunity for the commission of a 
criminal offense. 
In this case, the chemical ingredient was available only to licensed 
persons, and the Government itself had requested suppliers not to sell that 
ingredient even to people with a license. Yet the Government agent readily 
offered, and supplied, that ingredient to an unlicensed person and asked 
him to make a certain illegal drug with it. The Government then prose-
cuted that person for making the drug produced with the very ingredient 
which its agent had so helpfully supplied. This strikes me as the very pat-
tern of conduct that should be held to constitute entrapment as a matter of 
law. 
/d. at 448-49. 
99. 425 u.s. 484 (1976). 
I 00. The requested jury instruction read: 
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were sales of narcot-
ics supplied to him by an informer in the employ of or acting on behalf of 
the government, then you must acquit the defendant because the law as a 
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Russell, both the trial court and the court of appeals rejected this 
instruction.101 On appeal, the defense did not request that the predis-
position test be rejected,102 but rather seized upon the statement in 
Russell suggesting the possibility of a situation sufficiently outra-
geous that due process principles would apply.103 A plurality10" of 
the Court acknowledged that the government's role in the present 
case was more significant than that in Russell. Nevertheless, the 
plurality dismissed the defendant's due process argument, indicating 
that the government's conduct did not deprive the defendant of any 
constitutional protections. The plurality stated: 
The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the fifth 
amendment come into play only when the Government activ-
ity in question violates some protected right of the defendant. 
. . . But the police conduct here no more deprived defendant 
of any right secured to him by the United States Constitu-
tion than did the police conduct in Russell deprive Russell of 
any rights.105 
Justices Powell and Blackmun joined in the judgment and with 
matter of policy forbids his conviction in such a case. 
·Furthermore, under this particular defense, you need not consider the 
predisposition of the defendant to commit the offense charged, because if 
the governmental involvement through its informer reached the point that 
I have just defined in your own minds, then the predisposition of the de-
fendant would not matter. 
!d. at 488 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9). 
101. !d. at 488. , 
102. The defense counsel's strategy proved wise because the plurality spoke 
strongly in support of the Russell opinion: 
· In Russell we held that the statutory defense of entrapment was not 
available where it was conceded that a Government agent supplied a nec-
essary ingredient in the manufacture of an illicit drug. We reaffirmed the 
principle of Sorrells v. United States and Sherman v. United States, that 
the entrapment defense "focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the 
defendant to commit the crime," rather than upon the conduct of the Gov-
ernment's agents. We ruled out the possibility that the defense of entrap-
ment could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as 
this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime 
was established. 
In holding that "[i]t is only when the Government's deception actu-
ally implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant that the 
defense of entrapment comes into play," we, of course, rejected the con-
trary view of the dissents in that case and the concurrences in Sorrells, 
and Sherman. 
!d. at 488-89 (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 429, 436 (citations omitted)). 
103. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
104. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and 
Justice White. 
105. 425 U.S. at 490-91 (emphasis in original). 
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"much of the plurality opinion directed specifically to Hampton's 
contention."106 They did not, however, accept the wide dismissal of 
the due process argument.107 Justices Powell and Blackmun pre-
ferred to leave the due process question open, and to retain the 
Court's "supervisory power to bar conviction of a predisposed de-
fendant because of outrageous police conduct."108 
Justices Brennan, Stewart1 and Marshall dissented, adhering to 
the view originally espoused by Justice Roberts in Sorrells/09 and 
concluded that the police conduct-providing an unlawful sub-
stance-"would plainly be held to constitute entrapment as a matter 
of law."110 The dissenting Justices, however, believed that the con-
viction should have been reversed even under the subjective test. The 
opinion focused on the activity of the government, which was "more 
pervasive" in Hampton than in Russel/.m 
106. !d. at 491. 
107. Justices Powell and Blackmun commented: 
In discussing Hampton's due process contention, [the plurality] enunciates 
a per se rule: 
"[In Russell,] [w]e ruled out the possibility that the defense of en-
trapment could ever be based upon governmental misconduct in a 
case, such as this one, where the predisposition of the defendant to 
commit the crime was established. 
"The remedy of the criminal defendant with respect to the 
acts of Government agents, which . . . are encouraged by 
him, lies solely in the defense of entrapment." 
The plurality thus says that the concept of fundamental fairness in-
herent in the guarantee of due process would never prevent the con-
viction of a predisposed defendant, regardless of the outrageousness 
of police behavior in light of the surrounding circumstances. 
!d. at 492 (quoting id. at 488-89, 490) (citations omitted). 
108. !d. at 493. 
109. 287 U.S. 485 (I 932). The dissent went beyond the Sorrells opinion: 
While the Court has rejected any view of entrapment that does not 
focus on predisposition, a reasonable alternative inquiry might be whether 
the accused would have obtained the contraband from a source other than 
the Government. This factor could be brought into the case through the 
jury charge. Once the accused comes forward with evidence that the Gov-
ernment is the supplier, the prosecution would bear the burden of proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt either (I) that the Government is not the sup-
plier or (2) that the defendant would have obtained the contraband else-
where to complete the transaction. 
425 U.S. at 496 n.J. 
I 10. /d. at 497. 
Ill. The dissent reasoned: 
In any event, I think that reversal of petitioner's conviction is also 
compelled for those who follow the "subjective" approach to the defense of 
entrapment. ... [T]he Government's role in the criminal activity involved 
in this case was more pervasive than the Government involvement in Rus-
sell. In addition, I agree with [the concurring opinion] that Russell does 
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The dissent carefully avoided deciding the due process argu-
ment.112 Instead, it concluded that the case should have been re-
solved in favor of the defense "as a matter of law where the subject 
of the criminal charge is the sale of contraband provided to the de-
fendant by a Government agent."113 
The opinion in Hampton, therefore, is ambiguous. A clear ma-
jority of the Court reaffirmed the subjective entrapment test of Sor-
rells and Russell. Only three Justices, however, cast negative ·votes 
not foreclose imposition of a bar to conviction-based upon our supervisory 
power or due process principles-where the conduct of law enforcement 
authorities is sufficiently offensive, even though the individuals entitled to 
invoke such a defense might be "predisposed." In my view, the police ac-
tivity in this case was beyond permissible limits. 
Two facts significantly distinguish this case from Russell. First, the 
chemical supplied in that case was not contraband. It is legal to possess 
and seii phenyl-2-propanone and, although the Government there supplied 
an ingredient that was essential to the manufacture of methamphetamine, 
it did not supply the contraband itself. In contrast, petitioner claims that 
the very narcotic he is accused of selling was supplied by an agent of the 
Government. 
Second, the de(endant in Russell "was an active participant in an ille-
gal drug manufacturing enterprise which began before the Government 
agent appeared on the scene, and continueil after the Government agent 
had left the scene." Russeii was charged with unlawfuiiy manufacturing 
and processing methamphetamine, and his crime was participation in an 
ongoing operation. In contrast, the two sales for which petitioner was con-
victed were ailegedly instigated by Government agents and completed by 
the Government's purchase. The beginning and end of the crime thus coin-
cided exactly with the Government's entry into and withdrawal from the 
criminal activity involved in this case, while the Government was not simi-
larly involved in Russeii's crime. 
Whether the differences from the Russeii situation are of degree or of 
kind, I think they clearly require a different result. Where the Govern-
ment's agent deliberately sets up the accused by supplying him with con-
traband and then bringing him to another agent as a potential purchaser, 
the Government's role has passed the point of toleration. The Government 
is doing nothing less than buying contraband from itself through an inter-
mediary and jailing the intermediary. There is little, if any, law enforce-
ment interest promoted by such conduct; plainly it is not designed to dis-
cover ongoing drug traffic. Rather, such conduct deliberately entices an 
individual to commit a crime. That the accused is "predisposed" cannot 
possibly justify the action of government officials in purposefuiiy creating 
the crime. No one would suggest that the police could round up and jail ali 
"predisposed" individuals, yet that is precisely what set-ups like the instant 
one are intended to accomplish. Thus, this case is nothing less that an 
instance of "the Government . . . seeking to punish for an aiieged offense 
which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials." 
/d. at 497-99 (citations omitted). 
112. ld. at 500 n.4. 
113. /d. at 500. Justice Brennan's dissent relied heavily on the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion in United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971). 
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on the application of the Due Process Clause to the entrapment 
defense. 
IV. THE STATE APPROACH 
Neither the majority nor the minority Supreme Court view of 
entrapment advocates a general constitutional basis for the entrap-
ment defense.114 Thus, reasonable governmental inducement, even 
toward a nondisposed suspect, does not violate any constitutional 
right. If it did, than legislatures could not ignore entrapment de-
fenses or legislate entrapment statutes without severe constitutional 
limitations. States have been free to form their own opinions con-
cerning the entrapment defense and to establish their own parame-
ters as to its theoretical underpinnings and application. As a result, 
states have often taken their own initiative in establishing either the 
subjective or objective view of entrapment by judicial decision or 
statute. Some states have attempted to combine the views and have 
shown ingenuity in resolving the procedural ramifications of these 
views.1111 
A. The Objective Test 
The states that have adopted the objective view have been as-
sisted by numerous formulations of the test, particularly that of the 
Model Penal Code (M.P.C.). Indeed, the formulation of the entrap-
ment defense in the M.P.C. in 1962 was the first clear step after 
Sorrells in establishing the objective view as a viable alternative. In 
section 2.13, entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or 
informant induces or encourages another person to engage in con-
duct constituting a criminal offense by either: 
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to in-
duce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or 
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement that cre-
ate a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed 
by persons other than those who are ready to commit it.116 
The virtue of the M.P.C. is its focus on the government ("law en-
forcement official['s] ... employing methods of persuasion"117) 
rather than on the predisposition of the defendant. Thus, this test 
strongly follows the Roberts-Frankfurter-Stewart-Brennan approach 
to entrapment. The obvious difficulty, seized upon by the majority of 
114. A possible Due Process claim for outrageous government conduct might 
exist. 
115. See generally Entrapment Procedures, supra note 57. 
116. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
117. /d. 
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the Supreme Court, is that it deals with hypothetical people and al-
lows culpable individuals to be set free. 
After the acceptance of the objective view in the M.P.C.,118 
states slowly began to adopt the view. Scholarly commentary that 
overwhelmingly supported this view as superior to the subjective 
view facilitated this gradual acceptance.119 Alaska led the way in 
adopting the objective view of entrapment in Grossman v. State.120 
The Court noted that the "underlying basis of entrapment is found 
in public policy."121 It quoted with approval this statement by 
Learned Hand: "The whole doctrine derives from a spontaneous 
I).10ral revulsion against using the powers of government to beguile 
innocent, though ductile, persons into lapses which they might other-
wise resist."122 On this basis, the court rejected the Supreme Court's 
subjective test of entrapment. The court reasoned that the subjective 
inquiry is limited to predisposition, placing the defendant on trial for 
past offenses and character.123 The defendant, however, is prejudiced 
by the subjective approach, especially if the questfon is presented to 
a jury.124 Moreover, whether or not a defendant has a police record 
118. The accepted objective view is also reflected in the proposed Criminal 
Code Revision Act of 1981, which provides: 
§ 707. Entrapment 
(a) It is a bar to a prosecution for an offense that the defendant was 
entrapped into committing such offense. 
(b) Entrapment occurs when a Federal, State, or local law enforce-
ment agent, or a person cooperating with such an agent, induces the com-
mission of an offense, using persuasion or other means likely to cause a 
normally law-abiding person to commit the offense. Conduct merely af-
fording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute 
entrapment. 
H.R. 4711, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). 
119. See, e.g., L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF 
CRIME, 265-72 (1967); I WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON RE-
FORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 320 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BROWN COM-
MISSION]; Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and 
Agents Provocateurs; 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951); Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: 
Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea 
Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 687-90 (1975); McClean, Informers and Agent Provo-
cateurs, 1969 CRIM. L. REv. 527; Sagarin & MacNamara, The Problem of Entrap-
ment, 16 CRIME & DELINQ. 363 (1970); Schecter, Police Procedure and the Accu-
satorial Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BuLL. 521 (1967); Williams, The Defense of 
Entrapment and Related Problems in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FORDHAM L. REV. 
399 (1959). For support of the subjective approach, see DeFeo, supra note 14; Park, 
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163 (1976). 
120. 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969). 
121. /d. at 227. 
122. /d. 
123. /d. at 229. 
124. /d. 
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will yield different results.1211 The majority of the Alaska Supreme 
Court stated that "[t]o speak of entrapment as an implied statutory 
condition, and then to focus inquiry on the origin of intent, the im-
plantation of criminal design, and the predisposition of the defendant 
does not make much sense."126 Instead, the court concluded that the 
proper view would be one that "focuses the determination upon the 
particular conduct of the police in the cases presented."127 
The formulation of the objective view in Grossman is interesting 
because it characterizes the hypothetical person as an "average per-
son."128 Although the Alaska Supreme Court has conceded that the 
objective test does not eliminate all difficult issues,129 the objective 
test has spread to other states. The Brown Commission instigated the 
spread by adopting the objective standard in 1971. Its test is similar 
to that in Grossman: "[E]ntrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
agent induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or 
other means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit 
the offense."130 
Perhaps the most significant acceptance of the objective view of 
the entrapment defense occurred in 1970 when California judicially 
embraced the view in People v. Barraza.131 Prior to this time, Cali-
fornia strictly had followed the subjective view. Undoubtedly, the 
Barraza decision resulted in large part from Chief Justice Traynor's 
!d. 
125. !d. 
126. !d. 
127. !d. 
128. The court stated that under the objective test: 
[u]nlawful entrapment occurs when a public law enforcement official, or a 
person working in copperation with him, in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission of an offense, induces another person to commit such an of-
fense by persuasion or inducement which would be effective to persuade an 
average person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit such 
an offense. 
129. In Pascu v. State, 577 P.2d 1064, 1067 (Alaska 1978) (citations omit-
ted), the court stated: 
[T]here are certain difficulties in applying the foregoing standard. An "av-
erage person" probably cannot be induced to commit a serious crime ex-
cept under circumstances so extreme as to amount to duress. Yet it is clear 
that entrapment may occur where the degree of inducement falls short of 
actual duress. What is prohibited, by Grossman, is unreasonable or uncon-
scionable efforts on the part of the police to induce one to commit a crime 
so that he may be arrested and prosecuted for the offense. In determining 
whether entrapment has occurred, the trial court must focus "upon the 
particular conduct of the police in the case presented." The question is 
really whether that conduct falls below an acceptable standard for the fair 
and honorable administration of justice. 
130. BROWN COMMISSION, supra note 119, § 702(2). 
131. 23 Cal. 3d 675, 591 P.2d 947, 153 Cal. Rptr. 459 (1979). 
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famous dissenting opinion in People v. Moran. 132 In that opinion, 
Chief Justice Traynor traced the development of the entrapment 
doctrine, acknowledging that the purpose of the defense is not to 
protect the "innocent, but to protect the purity of government 
processes and to deter impermissible police conduct."133 He then 
stressed that the correct test would be the objective one, in which 
"the court must concern itself with the activity it would seek to con-
trol. It must not lose sight of that purpose by focusing on the charac-
ter and conduct of the accused."134 He further explained that all po-
lice conduct cannot be condemned because a person might be 
tempted to commit a crime. An officer, despite appearing to be a 
willing participant in a crime, may not induce a person to commit a 
crime who would not do so otherwise; that is, the officer cannot 
manufacture the crime. The distinction is "drawn between methods 
likely to persuade those otherwise unwilling to commit an offense 
from methods likely to persuade only those who are ready to do 
so."1311 Thus, "the test must be objective and focus only on the meth-
ods used."136 
In Barraza, the "court followed Chief Justice Traynor's reason-
ing. The court reiterated, however, that "entrapment is a facet of a 
broader problem."137 The court reasoned that entrapment is a form 
of lawless law enforcement, springing from a common motivation 
similar to illegal search and seizure, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal 
detention, and the third degree.136 Moreover, "[e]ach is condoned by 
the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals 
or the 'criminal classes,' justifies the employment of illegal 
means."139 The court adopted the formulation of the entrapment 
doctrine espoused by the Brown Commission based on the "normally 
law-abiding person" standard.140 
Most states that have adopted the objective view of entrapment 
132. I Cal. 3d 755, 463 P.2d 763, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411 (1970). 
133. Id. at 763, 463 P.2d at 768, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 416. 
134. ld. at 765, 463 P.2d at 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 417. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. 23 Cal. 3d at 689, 591 P.2d at 955, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 467 (quoting 
Donnelly, supra note 117, at 1111). 
!d. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. !d. The court justified this formulation: 
For the purposes of this test, we presume that such a person would nor-
mally resist the temptation to commit a crime presented by the simple 
opportunity to act unlawfully .... [B]ut it is impermissible for the police 
or their agents to pressure the suspect by overbearing conduct such as 
badgering, cajoling, importuning, or other affirmative acts likely to induce 
a normally law-abiding person to commit the crime. 
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have done so by statute.141 In the early 1970s, after California had 
provided authoritative precedent, Arkansas, Hawaii, North Dakota, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah all adopted statutes establishing the 
objective view.142 These states modeled their laws after the M.P.C., 
the Brown Commission model, or Justice Frankfurter's opinion in 
Sherman. The Pennsylvania statute is typical and provides: 
(a) General Rule. A public law enforcement official or a 
person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates 
an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the 
commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another 
person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by 
either: 
1. making knowingly false representations designed to 
induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or 
2. employing methods of persuasion or inducement 
which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be 
committed by persons other than those who are ready to 
commit it. 
(b) Burden of Proof. Except as provided in subsection 
(c) of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be 
acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that 
his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment.143 
Currently, about a dozen states have adopted the objective view of 
entrapment in one of its various forms. In the last ten years, how-
ever, the trend toward the objective view has waned. Unless the 
United States Supreme Court changes its view, or the version of the 
Proposed Revised Criminal Code containing an objective standard is 
enacted, considerable movement in that direction remains 
unlikely .144 
B. The Subjective Test 
The states that follow the subjective view of entrapment have 
essentially done so judicially, following the precedent of the United 
States Supreme Court or the corresponding federal circuit court. A 
141. Other states have adopted the objective view by judicial decision. See, 
e.g., State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 
210 N.W.2d 336 (1973). 
142. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-209 (1977); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 702-237 
(1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11 (1985); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 313 
(Purdon 1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 8.06 (Vernon 1974); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 
76-2-303 ( 1978). 
143. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 313 (Purdon 1983). 
144. Several versions of a revised federal criminal code have been proposed in 
recent years. See, e.g., H.R. 4711, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); S. 1630, 97th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1981); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). 
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number of states, however, have adopted statutes reflecting the sub-
jective view, either explicitly or by interpretation. The Illinois statute 
is typical and provides: 
A person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited 
or induced by a public officer or employee, or agent of either, 
for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of 
such person. However, this Section is inapplicable if a public 
officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to such 
person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense 
in furtherance of a criminal purpose which such person has 
originated.1411 
The formulations of these statutes vary considerably. Often, the 
"subjective" character of the statute is not apparent on its face and 
requires judicial interpretation to determine its applied content. The 
statutes that do display their subjective character do so by emphasiz-
ing the mental state of the particular defendant. This usually is done 
with language such as "origin of intent," "predisp_osition," or sugges-
tions that, but for the inducement, the defendant "would not other-
wise have committed the crime." 
C. The Hybrid Test 
A few states have adopted entrapment statutes that, regardless 
of the wording of the statute, are interpreted to contain both subjec-
tive and objective elements. Prior to the enactment of an entrapment 
statute, two entrapment defenses existed in New Jersey, each reflect-
ing a different view of the defense. 
The subjective entrapment defense was available when the 
police had implanted a criminal plan in the mind of an inno-
cent person who otherwise would not have committed the 
crime. The burden in this type of entrapment case was on the 
State to prove to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt the ab-
sence of entrapment. In contrast, the objective entrapment 
defense was available when the police conduct was impermis-
sible, even if the defendant had been predisposed to commit 
the crime. Whether this type of entrapment existed would be 
determined by the trial court.146 
In 1979 the legislature adopted an entrapment statute that combined 
the two tests.147 The New Jersey Supreme Court explained the rela-
145. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-12 (Smith-Hurd 1972). 
146. New Jersey v. Rockholt, 96 N.J. 570, 576, 476 A.2d 1236, 1239 (1984) 
(footnote omitted). 
147. The statute provides: 
a. A public law enforcement official or a person engaged in coopera-
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tionship between the two "prongs" of the New Jersey entrapment 
law, noting that the new law modified the prior entrapment law in 
three ways. First, it shifted the burden of proof from the state to the 
defendant by requiring the defendant to prove entrapment by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. Second, the new law requires both the 
subjective and objective asp~cts of entrapment to be determined by 
the trier of fact. Third, the new definition of entrapment requires 
that the police conduct establish a substantial risk that an offense 
would be committed by persons lacking the predisposition to commit 
it and that the police conduct caused the defendant to commit the 
offense.148 
New Hampshire law similarly seems to combine both of the 
traditional entrapment tests.149 As the Supreme Court of 'New 
tion with such an official or one acting as an agent of a public law enforce-
ment official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining 
evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages and, as 
a direct result, causes another person to engage in conduct constituting 
such offense by either: 
(I) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the be-
lief that such conduct is not prohibited; or · 
(2) Employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a 
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other 
than those who are ready to commit it. 
b. Except as provided in subsection c. of this section, a person prose-
cuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of 
evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. The issue 
of entrapment shall be tried by the trier of fact. 
c. The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or 
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the 
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a 
person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment. 
N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:2-12 (West 1982). 
148. 96 N.J. at 577, 476 A.2d at 1239. The court explained the procedural 
approach to the statute: 
In sum, under the Code, when' there is evidence of. entrapment and 
that defense is asserted, the trial court should submit the issue to the jury. 
The court's charge should explain that the defendant must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the police conduct constituted entrap-
ment by both objective and subjective standards. First, the defendant must 
prove that the police conduct constituted an inducement to crime by objec-
tive standards or, in the Code's terms, that the conduct by its nature cre-
ated a "substantial risk" that the crime would be committed by an average 
person who was not otherwise ready to commit it. The defendant would 
not satisfy this requirement if the evidence demonstrated that he was un-
usually susceptible to inducement and that an ordinary person would not 
have succumbed to the type of inducement to which he had succumbed. 
Second, the defendant must prove that the police conduct in fact caused 
him to commit the crime . . .. 
!d. at 581, 476 A.2d at 1241. 
149. The New Hampshire statute provides: 
36 THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:5 
Hampshire noted, the statute does not require that the standard in-
quiry "focus solely on the conduct of the police because in order for 
the defense to succeed the conduct must be 'such as to create a sub-
stantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not 
otherwise disposed to commit it.' "1110 
V. CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the English experience, the entrapment defense in 
the United States has developed as a vibrant and active doctrine. 
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the doctrine's basis being one of 
legislative intent has, however, severely limited the doctrine's devel-
opment. The Supreme Court's emphasis on this single ground has 
caused other courts deciding entrapment cases to focus on the de-
fendant's state of mind and to virtually exclude other factors, such 
as the nature of the government's conduct.151 This result is unfortu-
nate for a number of reasons. First, the procedural questions on the 
defense have become paramount. Issues such as inconsistent defenses 
and burden of proof often can dominate these proceedings and cause 
both judge and jury to lose sight of the fundamental issue. Second, 
the fundamental issue is not often the main point of debate-the 
nature of the government's conduct. The legislative intent inquiry 
involves an analysis of a legal fiction-what the legislators had in 
mind in drafting substantive criminal statutes. As pointed out by the 
concurring Supreme Court Justices, 152 the real purpose for the en-
trapment doctrine is to curb overreaching governmental intrusion in 
the detection and potential development of criminal activity. The ob-
jective approach of the M.P.C. properly requires substantial inquiry 
into this difficult area. However, until the United States Supreme 
It is an affirmative defense that the actor committed the offense because 
he was induced or encouraged to do so by a Jaw enforcement official or by 
a person acting in cooperation with a Jaw enforcement official, for the pur-
pose of obtaining evidence against him and when the methods used to ob-
tain such evidence were such as to create a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. 
However, conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an 
offense does not constitute entrapment. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 626:5 (1974). 
150. State v. Little, 121 N.H. 765, 771, 435 A.2d 517, 520 (1981) (quoting, 
in part, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 626:5 (emphasis in original). 
151. Sherman, 356 U.S. 369, is an obvious exception to this point, as the 
Court dealt harshly with the government activity. Hampton, 425 U.S. 484, and 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, are far more typical. 
152. See especially Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sherman, 356 
u.s. 369, 378-85. 
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Court rejects the subjective test, it is highly unlikely that the focus 
will shift from the defendant toward a policy review of governmental 
conduct. 
